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Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87 (Oct. 30, 2008) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Summary
Appeal from a district court order denying relief for ineffective assistance in a
criminal case resulting in deportation.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed the district court order denying relief for ineffective assistance by an
interpreter but reversed and remanded the district court order denying relief for
ineffective assistance by counsel.
Factual and Procedural History
Rubio is a Mexican native that has resided in Las Vegas with her husband and
four children as a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1999. Two of her
children have cerebral palsy and require special care. On September 29, 2005, she rearended her husband’s car when she observed him driving the car in the company of
another woman. Rubio was arrested and charged with one count of battery with the use
of a deadly weapon.
On February 13, 2006, Rubio met with her court-appointed public defender who
presented her with a plea agreement written in English. Rubio is not fluent in English so
Rubio met with a Spanish-language interpreter, who read the agreement to Rubio in
Spanish. Rubio then signed the agreement, pleading guilty to the offense in exchange for
a lesser sentence.
The plea agreement included language explaining the possible immigration
consequences. It also contained standard language indicating that she was signing the
agreement voluntarily and that her attorney answered all her questions regarding the plea
agreement to her satisfaction.
Rubio told the district court that she understood that plea agreement, discussed the
rights she was waiving with her attorney, had no questions, and had signed the agreement
freely and voluntarily. The district court sentenced her to probation for up to three years
and required, as a condition of probation, that Rubio comply with Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) directives.
After Rubio’s conviction, she was taken into custody by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. 2 While the
immigration court proceedings were pending, Rubio filed a motion in district court to
withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that she entered the agreement involuntarily without
effective assistance of counsel. In January 2007, Rubio was removed to Mexico.
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See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) which allows the INS to deport aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies.
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In her affidavit supporting the motion, Rubio claimed that she never discussed the
plea agreement with counsel and thought that the court interpreter would provide proper
advice. According to Rubio, counsel referred her to the court interpreter and counsel was
not present during the translation of the agreement. Also, Rubio claimed that the court
interpreter did not interpret the entire document and when Rubio asked the interpreter
about immigration consequences, the interpreter replied that Rubio should be fine as long
as she has papers. Rubio claimed that she was rushed into signing the agreement and if
she had been given the opportunity to discuss the agreement with counsel, she would not
have signed the agreement. Rubio also included information regarding her children’s
special care needs in her affidavit.
The district court denied the motion stating that the court had no control over the
INS, Rubio knew that there were immigration consequences with accepting the plea
agreement, and that an interpreter cannot provide ineffective assistance.
In a per curiam decision, the court affirmed that an interpreter cannot provide
ineffective assistance through affirmative misrepresentation but reversed and remanded
the district court decision, requiring an evidentiary trial to consider Rubio’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
Discussion
Standard of review
The court discussed the standard of review, stating that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is a de novo review but deference will be given to the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial
evidence. 3 The court also discussed burden of proof, stating that the defendant bears the
burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the plea was not
entered knowingly or voluntarily.” 4 A guilty plea is entered into knowingly and
voluntarily only if the defendant has “a full understanding of both the nature of the
charges and the direct consequences arising from a plea of guilty.” 5 The district court
must look beyond the hearing and evaluate the totality of the circumstances in order to
make the determination. 6 A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be granted in order to
correct a manifest injustice through ineffective assistance of counsel or “failure to
adequately inform a defendant of the consequences of his plea.” 7
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Lader v. Warden, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (Nev. 2005) (citing Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev.
1996)).
4
Foster v. State, 111 P.3d 1083, 1086 (Nev. 2005); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474, 475 (Nev. 1999).
5
Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540, 543 (Nev. 2001).
6
Id. at 544; Barajas, 991 P.2d at 475 (citing Bryant v. State, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (Nev. 1986)).
7
Barajas, 991 P.2d at 442; Paine v. State, 877 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Nev. 1994) overruled on other grounds by
Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440, 445-46 (Nev. 2002). See NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.165 (governing a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Ineffective assistance of counsel
The court stated that effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution.8 The court also applied the two-prong Strickland test,
which requires “that [her] counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and [the plaintiff] suffered prejudice as a result” in order to determine
there was ineffective assistance of counsel. 9
Deportation is collateral consequence, generally not affecting the validity of a guilty plea
The court stated that immigration issues are collateral consequences of a guilty
plea and do not affect the voluntariness of the plea. 10 As a general rule, counsel’s failure
to inform the defendant of collateral consequences is not objectively unreasonable and,
therefore, does not meet the first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance. 11
However, Barajas did not address the issue of affirmative misrepresentation of
immigration issues. 12
We adopt the affirmative misrepresentation exception to the collateral consequence rule
Both the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted an affirmative
misrepresentation exception for deportation, holding that affirmative misrepresentation
regarding immigration consequences may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 13
The court found the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals to be
persuasive and adopted the affirmative misrepresentation exception to the collateral
consequence rule. However, the court held that an evidentiary hearing is required
invalidate a guilty plea for affirmative misrepresentation. The defendant still bears the
burden to demonstrate affirmative misrepresentation, making counsel’s performance
unreasonable, and prejudice in order to meet both prongs of the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance.
Rubio did not clearly establish affirmative misrepresentation
However, the court declined to extend the affirmative misrepresentation rule to
the facts in this case because the affirmative misrepresentation came from the interpreter,
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Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261, 262 n.6 (Nev. 1988) (citing Turner v. State of Tenn., 858 F.2d 1201 (6th
Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989) (“[c]onstitution guarantees effective counsel
when rejecting a plea offer”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[c]onstitution guarantees
effective counsel when accepting guilty plea”)).
9
Avery v. State, 129 P.3d 664, 669 (Nev. 2006) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1996); Warden
v. Lyons, 683 P.2d 504 (Nev. 1984)).
10
Barajas, 991 P.2d at 475.
11
Id. at 476 (citing United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)).
12
Id. at 476 n.1.
13
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179,
187 (2d Cir. 2002).

3

not the attorney. The court held that the exception only applies to the relationship
between attorney and client.
Rubio’s claims regarding counsel’s assistance during the plea process warrant an
evidentiary hearing
A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determine whether “a
defendant entered a guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.” 14 An evidentiary hearing
may be necessary to determine any constitutional issues. 15 If the defendant’s claims are
not supported by the record, then the district court can reject the claims without an
evidentiary hearing. 16 The court found that although the formal plea agreement
contained a statement noting that the plea may carry immigration consequences, the
district court did not ask whether counsel reviewed the entire plea agreement with Rubio
or if the information regarding the possible immigration consequences was translated for
Rubio. Therefore, the court could not determine if Rubio’s claims were unsupported by
the record. If the nonlegally trained interpreter was the only person who reviewed the
plea agreement with Rubio, that act may violate due process and meet the first prong of
the Strickland test.
The court could also not determine if Rubio suffered prejudice, the second prong
of the Strickland test, because the district court did not consider the condition of Rubio’s
children and the role that their condition might have played in Rubio’s decision. Because
of the condition of her children, it is possible that Rubio would have opted for trial
instead of a guilty plea if she was informed of the possible risks of deportation associated
with pleading guilty. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Conclusion
The court adopted the affirmative misrepresentation exception for the collateral
consequence rule regarding deportation and ineffective assistance, but held that the
exception did not apply to Rubio because the misrepresentation regarding deportation
risks did not come from counsel. However, the court held that the district court abused
its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Rubio’s claims that her counsel
abandoned her and that she was prejudiced by the lack of legal advice. The court
therefore affirmed the district court’s order regarding the interpreter’s ineffective
assistance but reversed and remanded the district court’s order regarding Rubio’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, instructing the district court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on those claims.
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Little v. Warden, 34 P.3d 540, 544 (Nev. 2001).
Id.
16
See Hargrove v. State, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1984).
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